1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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3	22-CV-7553(CBA) LORRAINE MASCIARELLI,
4	United States Courthouse Plaintiff, Brooklyn, New York
5	
6	-versus- September 06, 2023 2:00 p.m.
7	NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
8	Defendant.
9	x
10	TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE CAROL B. AMON UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
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13	APPEARANCES
14	For the Plaintiff: BY: AUSTIN GRAFF, ESQ.
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16	For the Defendant: BY: DONALD SULLIVAN, ESQ. MATHEW JOHN, ESQ. ANDREA MARTIN, ESQ.
17	MADIABIL PRINCITIA, DOQ.
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19	Court Reporter: Rivka Teich, CSR, RPR, RMR, FCRR Phone: 718-613-2268
20	Email: RivkaTeich@gmail.com
21	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography. Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.
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1	(In open court.)
2	THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All Rise. This is
3	Masciarelli vs. New York City Department of Education, docket
4	22-CV-7553, on for an oral argument on defendant's motion to
5	dismiss.
6	Can I ask the parties to please state their
7	appearances starting with counsel for the defendant, please.
8	MR. SULLIVAN: Good afternoon, your Honor. From the
9	Office of the Corporation Counsel, Donald C. Sullivan. Your
10	Honor, may I introduce my colleagues. They are experienced
11	but not yet admitted to this Court.
12	THE COURT: Sure.
13	MR. JOHN: Good afternoon, your Honor. Matthew
14	John, assistant corporation counsel.
15	MS. MARTIN: Good afternoon, your Honor. Andrea
16	Martin, assistant corporation counsel.
17	THE COURT: When are your gentleman and lady going
18	to be admitted to our Court?
19	MR. JOHN: Unsure, your Honor.
20	MR. SULLIVAN: I understand they started the
21	paperwork, your Honor. It's a bureaucratic thing
22	THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure that the corp
23	counsel wasn't discriminating against the Eastern Districts.
24	MR. SULLIVAN: Understood, your Honor. Thank you.
25	THE COURT: Okay. And for plaintiff?

1	MR. GRAFF: Good afternoon, your Honor. Austin
2	Graff from the Scher Law Firm. I also have with me Lorraine
3	Masciarelli, the plaintiff herself.
4	THE COURT: All right. Everyone can be seated.
5	This is a motion to dismiss. Defendant want to be
6	heard?
7	MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, your Honor. Our basic
8	argument, your Honor, is that the mandate has been upheld by
9	numerous courts including the Second Circuit, including an
10	Article 78 Court that resolved the case brought by this
11	plaintiff, then petitioner.
12	THE COURT: What effect does that have? You said it
13	was there was an Article 78 proceeding that decided the
14	issue against the plaintiff here?
15	MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, your Honor. That Court it
16	was not dispositive of the issue currently before your Honor.
17	Ms. Masciarelli had not pled religious discrimination there.
18	However, the Court did uphold a vaccine mandate as a condition
19	of employment.
20	THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
21	MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you. Courts including the
22	Second Circuit have upheld the mandate as neutral and

THE COURT: That's Kane, correct?

generally applicable.

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MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, your Honor.

1	THE COURT: All right. So that is you say Kane
2	is dispositive of the free exercise claim?
3	MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, your Honor.
4	THE COURT: All right. But that's not the only
5	claim, correct?
6	MR. SULLIVAN: Correct, your Honor. Plaintiff is
7	also seeking she's got a claim of religious discrimination
8	and failure to accommodate. We believe both claims have been
9	addressed by the Courts prior to this. And the mandate has
10	been upheld consistently, your Honor.
11	THE COURT: Well, in terms of the failure to
12	accommodate, which case dealt with that?
13	MR. SULLIVAN: I would point to Kane also on that,
14	your Honor.
15	THE COURT: Go ahead.
16	MR. SULLIVAN: I have a note. Kane said that an
17	accommodation would cause could cause undue hardship or
18	results in a more than a de minimis cost.
19	THE COURT: Well, that's not the standard any longer
20	though, correct?
21	MR. SULLIVAN: Correct, your Honor.
22	THE COURT: Substantial, since DeGroff, is the
23	higher standard. So that case doesn't really govern, right?
24	MR. SULLIVAN: Correct, your Honor. I started to
25	say and I know plaintiff's opposition raised the DeGroff

case. And our reply papers pointed out that *DeGroff* -- even applying *DeGroff*, there is evidence in the record that shows we meet that standard, your Honor.

THE COURT: With respect to which accommodation though? The working from home accommodation or --

MR. SULLIVAN: I would submit both, your Honor. We've explained that there were so many teachers who wanted to work from home, that was not a realistic alternative available to us.

And then with respect to the vaccine mandate, at the time, your Honor, testing was -- prior to the mandate, testing was an option. But once testing became available, then the mandate required it because, again, in plaintiff's particular position, she was a teacher, and she would be teaching young students, many of whom would not be eligible for the vaccine and would -- transmission to family would be --

THE COURT: What about testing and masking? Why wouldn't that have been a reasonable accommodation?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, again, your Honor, given the situation of her teaching young students, we felt that the risk is too great and courts have --

THE COURT: Was that requested or actually ruled upon though? Was there a request made? Were there accommodation of testing and masking?

MR. SULLIVAN: I'll have to search my memory, your

Honor. I don't recall at the moment the standard. But I
would but I would say again that, you know, had it been
made, would have been well appropriate for us to deny it,
given the situation at the time.

THE COURT: Is that something that can be decided on the face of the complaints, that that would have been too great a hardship? I mean, it wasn't requested here, and they actually didn't rule on it, right?

Did they have the -- did you have the responsibility to consider it and rule on it in terms of that interactive process?

MR. SULLIVAN: It wasn't requested, your Honor. I would not put that responsibility on us. But, again, I keep bringing it back to it still was not a realistic alternative, given the plaintiff's position.

THE COURT: What position was that?

MR. SULLIVAN: As a teacher of young students.

THE COURT: What was her -- what are you contending was her specific subject?

MR. SULLIVAN: She was just an elementary school teacher. I'm not saying a particular subject. I'm saying -THE COURT: She was an elementary school teacher.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SULLIVAN: The students that she was teaching were not yet eligible for vaccines.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from plaintiff's

1 counsel.

MR. GRAFF: Thank you, your Honor. The plaintiff was denied a religious accommodation for the COVID-19 vaccine mandate because of anti-religious animus and that can be shown in three ways.

First, the original --

THE COURT: Is this the free exercise claim you're making? When you say animus, which claim are you talking about?

MR. GRAFF: I'm sorry. It's both the discrimination claim and the First Amendment because it goes to the pretext for the undue burden and also goes --

THE COURT: I mean, in terms of the 1983 action, the free exercise, why isn't *Kane* dispositive of your case?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ GRAFF: I think Kane actually helps in the Second Circuit.

THE COURT: How is that?

MR. GRAFF: The Second Circuit's decision says that the arbitration ward and accommodation standards were, and I quote on page 22, "We have great doubts about whether the accommodation standards are consistent with the bedrock First Amendment principle. They provide that extension requests for recognized and establish religious organizations, and that request shall be denied when the leader of a religious organization has spoken publicly in favor of the vaccine with

the documentations readily available, e.g. from an online source, or where the objections of a personal, political, or philosophical nature."

The Court went on to say that in denying an individual a religious accommodation based on someone else's publicly expressed religious views, even the leader of her faith, runs afoul to the Supreme Court's teaching that it is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith or the validity of particular litigants.

THE COURT: Well, no, but that just means that you shouldn't go behind someone's expression that -- their reason for doing it, that it's religious. You shouldn't go behind that and determine whether it is a valid or not valid religious question.

But Kane says that they still have to prove.

Doesn't relieve the individual of the obligation to comply with the valid and neutral law of general applicability. And Kane found that the vaccine mandate was a valid and neutral law of general applicability.

MR. GRAFF: But your Honor --

THE COURT: That seems dispositive of your first amendment -- of your first free exercise claim.

MR. GRAFF: Your Honor, but the issue is not the vaccine mandate. The issue is how it was applied. And in

Kane, the second department, says that as applied to
plaintiffs --

THE COURT: Kane is Second Circuit, not second department.

MR. GRAFF: Oh, I'm sorry. Second Circuit.

As applied to the plaintiffs, it was not neutral.

And that's on page 23 of -- I'm sorry -- 167. It also says it was not generally applicable to all those seeking religious accommodation. It also says that the plaintiffs have thus shown that they are likely to succeed on their claim that the arbitration award procedures, as applied to them, were not generally applicable. That's the Second Circuit.

So the vaccine mandate itself is separate and apart from the procedures applied to the plaintiff when she made her request for accommodation. And the request for accommodation only looked at one request, which wasn't even made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked not to be vaccinated. All they looked at is whether she could work from home. There was no interactive process. There was no consultation.

THE COURT: Well, what she had -- they indicated that her working -- did she request to work from home?

MR. GRAFF: No. She requested no vaccine. Every -my understanding is every accommodation request only looked at
whether the employee can stay home and work. It did not
consider testing and masking. And the reason is, is because

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THE COURT: Did she request testing and masking?

MR. GRAFF: She requested not to take the vaccine.

4 But there was no opportunity for her to make a request and

5 interact with the people making the decision regarding her

6 | accommodation request. It was all on paper.

THE COURT: Her accommodation request was simply, "I don't want to take the vaccine, then"?

MR. GRAFF: Correct.

10 THE COURT: That's not an accommodation request.

11 That's just, "I don't want to comply."

MR. GRAFF: That begins the process. That should have begun a process that would have led to determining what was an accommodation that was reasonable under the circumstances.

Under the New York City Human Rights Law, they had an obligation to do the interactive process, and they did not do that.

THE COURT: What about under Title VII?

MR. GRAFF: With respect to Title VII, she had a bona fide religious belief, which was known to the city, and conflicted with an employment requirement, the vaccine. She informed the defendant, her employer, of her belief. She was disciplined, which was placed on leave without pay, and then ultimately terminated from her employment for failing to

1	comply with the conflicting employment requirement.
2	THE COURT: What grade did she teach?
3	THE PLAINTIFF: At the time, Judge, I taught
4	physical education preK through five. However, I am
5	permanently certified in New York state to teach kindergarten,
6	first grade, second grade, third grade, fourth grade, fifth
7	grade, sixth grade, seventh grade, eighth grade, ninth grade,
8	tenth grade, eleventh grade, twelfth grade physical education
9	as well as special education. I'm also certified
10	THE COURT: Let me just indicate at the time that
11	you were working and you refused to take the vaccine, what
12	were you teaching then?
13	THE PLAINTIFF: At that time I was teaching preK
14	through five physical education.
15	THE COURT: So preK through fifth grade physical
16	education.
17	THE PLAINTIFF: Yes.
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	THE PLAINTIFF: But I'm certified to teach all these
20	other grades.
21	THE COURT: Okay.
22	MR. GRAFF: So the plaintiff can meet the prima
23	facie case for a Title VII. The burden then shifts to the

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defendant to say undue burden. The testing request for an

accommodation, the defendants say, cannot be fulfilled because

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the vaccine mandate actually said that teachers -unvaccinated teachers could not be in the classroom with their
students. That shows their animus towards religious -towards religion.

THE COURT: Why?

MR. GRAFF: Because the same entity that created the first mandate that had no religious exemption is the same entity that said you have to -- you can't be in the classroom if you're unvaccinated. They said that the public employer --

THE COURT: What does the statement that she can't be in the classroom if you're not vaccinated, what does that have to do with religion one way or the other?

MR. GRAFF: Because it's set up for there could never be an accommodation. The first vaccine mandate said no exemption. Then the public employer union said, We're going to take you to court. And they backed down. They had the exemption. But the exemption was just in words only because the accommodation that they only examined was to work from home, which they said was an undue burden. It's circular logic. You can never get an accommodation.

Out of 3,200 people who applied, only 100 people were given the accommodation. 80 to 85 percent of those requests were for religious emptions. And we don't have to stand here and prove our case. It's a plausibility standard. And I think, based upon the allegations in the complaint, that

1 | we've met that standard.

THE COURT: Tell me what you believe -- the causes of action that you believe your complaint sets forth because it's not real clear reading your complaint. What are the causes of -- just stick with the federal causes of action.

MR. GRAFF: Title VII religious discrimination and First Amendment, free exercise cause of action.

THE COURT: Okay. And there's no diversity here, correct? So assuming that there are no federal claims, then the state claims -- you do have state claims?

MR. GRAFF: We have not pled any state claims.

THE COURT: Oh. I thought you were talking a minute ago about what the New York human rights law said.

MR. GRAFF: That's the standard that they should have applied as when they were determining whether there should have been a reasonable accommodation. It's their own standard set forth in their own city code.

THE COURT: And what is that?

MR. GRAFF: That they had to perform an interactive process to determine what a reasonable accommodation could have been for her requested accommodation.

THE COURT: And there was no interactive process.

MR. GRAFF: There was no interactive process.

THE COURT: She never requested any specific accommodation? Is that what you're saying? She never

- 1 requested to work from home?
- 2 MR. GRAFF: No. She requested that she not be

3 vaccinated.

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THE COURT: That's not an accommodation.

MR. GRAFF: But that would have started an interactive process. And the only thing that they looked at the defendant was could she stay home, and she couldn't because they say it was an undue burden because too many people made the request.

isn't that a valid undue burden? In other words, if everybody stayed home, you don't have a school system. So why is staying home, particularly when you're a gym teacher, not a problem? Why wouldn't that be an undue burden on the system?

THE COURT: Well, why is that problem? I mean, why

MR. GRAFF: It may have, but there were other forms of accommodation like masking and testing that could have been granted to her. They did not examine that as an undue burden.

THE COURT: It was their responsibility to raise it and examine it?

MR. GRAFF: If they had the interactive process, it may have been raised by the plaintiff, and then they could have determined whether that accommodation was an undue burden.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. GRAFF: Thank you, your Honor.

1	MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, just to address that, my
2	understanding is the plaintiff appealed the denial and then
3	appealed the citywide panel. Certainly had an opportunity to
4	present any other options that she wanted us to consider,
5	but
6	THE COURT: Well, did you engage do you agree
7	that you have to engage in an interactive process, and did you
8	do that?
9	MR. SULLIVAN: Well, we did, your Honor. We
10	considered the possibility of placing plaintiff in a work from
11	home setting or alternate setting. We explained to her that
12	would be undue burden.
13	THE COURT: Well, what about did you ever
14	consider the testing and masking?
15	MR. SULLIVAN: Well, if I may, I was going to point,
16	your Honor, to where we, in our reply papers, discuss the
17	testing and masking and why that wouldn't work. And I can
18	THE COURT: No, but was it ever forget about your
19	reply papers. Was it ever discussed at the time?
20	MR. SULLIVAN: I would have to get back to you on
21	that, your Honor. I apologize.
22	THE COURT: Why wouldn't that at least have the
23	potential to work? Testing and masking. She wore a mask in

MR. SULLIVAN: And that's where I would point to our

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class, she was tested every day.

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reply papers. There's a lengthy quotation from a Court on page 7 of our reply papers. I can read it as much as your Honor wants me to into the record now.

Case is Maniscalco vs. Department of Education, 563 F. Supp. 3d 33. I'm reading from pages 39 to 40.

The Court said, "Ultimately, even if plaintiffs disagree with it, the order at issue represents a rational policy decision surrounding how best to protect children during a global pandemic. Although the plaintiffs argue that there are other proven methods of preventing the spread of COVID-19 in schools, among them frequent testing and mask wearing, it is not shocking for the city to conclude that vaccination is the best way to do so, particularly at a time when viral transmission rates are so high."

THE COURT: Well, that was a different -- that statement was in a different context. Wasn't there an equal protection claim? And that was whether there was a rational basis for that -- that's different from an interactive process and whether that would have been accommodation. They weren't talking about whether that was a reasonable accommodation in that case, correct?

MR. SULLIVAN: Understood, your Honor. But I was just pointing to what your Honor -- I was having difficulty trying to explain to you the concerns we had about masking. And it ties into what plaintiff was saying now about the

interactive process.	I think	this	sums	up	what	the	issues
were with masking and	testing	•					

If I may, your Honor, the same quotation goes on to say: The CDC recommended vaccination of school teachers and staff as soon as possible because vaccination is -- and quoting from the CDC's decision -- "most critical strategy to help schools safely resume full operation. It is the leading public health prevention strategy to end the COVID-19 pandemic."

THE COURT: So testing and masking doesn't work in your view, you would argue, because children under 12 at the time were not vaccinated?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And it wasn't sufficient to stop the spread to those children?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, your Honor. And obviously the children would potentially spread it to their families.

THE COURT: Let me ask plaintiff's counsel, why wouldn't that, then, not be a reasonable accommodation?

MR. GRAFF: No other school district in the state had a vaccine mandate. All other schools that I'm aware of -- and I represent school --

THE COURT: We're not talking about the vaccine mandate now. We're past the vaccine mandate. The vaccine mandate has been upheld. The question is why isn't it -- why

haven't they shown it would be a substantial burden to do the testing and masking, because at preschool, masking and testing doesn't protect the -- wouldn't adequately protect the children, who were unvaccinated.

MR. GRAFF: That's hindsight. At the time when the plaintiff made her application, that wasn't considered. Right now we're standing in 2023. An undue burden looking backwards is different than what happened at the time. The only thing we should be looking at is what happened at the time.

And the fact that the commissioner of health said that vaccine is the best method and that unvaccinated cannot be in schools shows that there was never a chance for a religious person to get an accommodation because there was no way to accommodation that person.

THE COURT: Well, if the religious person had been a teacher of history in 12th grade, and that could have been done by Zoom as opposed to a phys. ed. teacher when the children were old enough to be vaccinated, why wouldn't that have worked?

MR. GRAFF: Because they did not consider what she what they taught in determining the accommodation. Nowhere in the papers does it say she's a gym teacher and that's why we're not granting it to her. It's a general denial because of undue burden.

THE COURT: There is no finding in the record one

- way or the other with respect to the plaintiff that testing and masking wouldn't work, right?
- MR. SULLIVAN: Not pertaining to the individual plaintiff no, your Honor.
- 5 THE COURT: So it wasn't -- no one suggested that 6 they didn't address that, correct?
- 7 MR. SULLIVAN: I didn't follow your question. I 8 apologize.

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- THE COURT: It just didn't come up in plaintiff's case. It wasn't suggested or analyzed as a reasonable accommodation.
- MR. SULLIVAN: I don't want to go that far, your
 Honor. I know that plaintiff never presented it to us --
 - THE COURT: Let me ask you the next question. In this interactive process, does plaintiff have to request it before you consider it? Or are you supposed to consider other options yourself in terms of --
 - MR. SULLIVAN: Again, we considered another option, and the other option was to work from home. The plaintiff is now asking us to consider additional options.
 - THE COURT: No. But back in the time, were you required to sua sponte, if you will, consider other options such as testing and masking?
 - MR. SULLIVAN: I did not understand that to be defendant's burden, your Honor. And I would point out that

1	plaintiff's counsel talked about what he referred to as the			
2	after-the-fact evidence, and the decision that I just read			
3	from is from 2021, your Honor.			
4	THE COURT: Counsel, when you were reading from the			
5	Kane decision, what there were a number of Kane decisions.			
6	What was the site from the case you were reading from?			
7	MR. GRAFF: 19 F.4th 152, Second Circuit,			
8	November 22, 2021.			
9	THE COURT: All right. Thank you, ladies and			
10	gentlemen. I'll reserve decision.			
11	MR. GRAFF: Thank you, your Honor.			
12	MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, your Honor.			
13	(Whereupon, the matter was concluded.)			
14	* * * *			
15	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.			
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17	/s/ Rivka Teich Rivka Teich, CSR RPR RMR FCRR Official Court Reporter Eastern District of New York			
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